Indexed OCR Text

Abū Hāmid al-Ghazālī
From Seclusion to Public Life
It would have been possible for Ghazalī to spend the rest of his life in solitary
meditation and contemplation, enjoying the bliss of spiritual visions. However,
for the great achievement Allah had destined him to accomplish, it was neces-
sary for Ghazalī to return again to teaching and writing. It was all the more
necessary for Ghazalī to refute the philosophers and atheists and restore the
upper hand to Islam in the fields of knowledge and intellect, especially as
Allah had granted him knowledge with certitude. There was then no other
personage in the entire world of Islam more suited for the task. The fact is
that Islam stood in need of him, and Allah wanted him to perform what had
already been set for him. He felt an urge to take up the defense of the faith.
He describes his feelings in these words:
When I looked around, I found that the faith of the people had been shaken
owing to the influence of the philosophers, ignorance of the mystics, inertia
of the jurists, and the weak and heartless vindication of religion by the theo-
logians. People were losing their conviction and, although some, overborne
by philosophy, still fulfilled the religious obligations, they had hardly any
conviction of faith left in their hearts. Certain people performed the prayers
merely as a physical exercise, some to emulate others; and there were others
who considered religious practice necessary for gaining certain material
benefits. These persons saw no harm in giving up these practices if they
could find a way to save themselves from the harm which non-performance
of religious observance would have entailed. I realized that I could easily
remove their doubts. I saw myself, in fact, fully capable of exposing the hol-
lowness and implausibility of their philosophical convictions because of my
deep knowledge of the speculative sciences. I therefore felt an ardent desire
to take up this work, since it appeared to be the crying need of the time. I said
to myself, "How does it befit you to sit in seclusion? It is an epidemic that is
spreading like wildfire, and the learned have themselves fallen victim to the
same disease? The servants of Allah have reached the brink of destruction."
But then I thought whether it would be possible for me to accomplish such a
huge task. I said to myself. "The guidance of the Prophet
was available in
the days of yore, but now if you invite men to truth and the way of Allah, the
world will turn your enemy. How will you single-handedly struggle against
them all and endure the hardships? This might have been possible under the
regime of a pious king determined to assist and promote religion.
Thus I expressed my helplessness before Allah and decided to spend the
121

SAVIOURS OF ISLAMIC SPIRIT
rest of my life in seclusion. But it seems Allah had willed otherwise. He cre-
ated a desire in the sultan's heart. The sultan emphatically commanded me
to proceed to Nishapur and fight the growing heretical tendencies. The king
had appealed to me so earnestly that my rejection of his order would have
certainly made him angry. Then I said to myself, "One of the reasons for your
resolve having fallen apart, it cannot be right now to remain in seclusion, for
this would simply mean avoiding discomforts and hardships. Has not Allah
said, 'Do men imagine that they will be left alone (at ease) because they say
we believe and not be tested with affliction? Lo! We tested those who were
before you. Thus Allah knows those who are sincere and knows those who
feign' [Q 28:2-3].
"And Allah addressed his prophet thus even as he was the most exalted of
His servants: 'Messengers indeed have been denied before you, and they were
patient under the denial and the persecution till Our succor reached them.
There is none to alter the decision of Allah. Already there has reached you
some of the tidings of the messengers (we sent before)"" [Q 6:34].
I also sought the advice of a few friends who were illuminated and have
had spiritual visions. They advised me to give up seclusion. Few of them
related the dreams some pious persons had seen which indicated that the step
I proposed to take would have far-reaching effect for the revival of faith. They
hinted that in the fifth century, which was to begin in a month, something
remarkable was to happen that would renew the faith. It has been foretold in
the hadith that at the beginning of every century Allah brings forth a man
who restores and reanimates the faith of the people. All these tidings gave
me hope. Allah made it easy for me to set off to Nishapur, and I finally made
up my mind to renounce seclusion in 499/1106.
I had left Baghdad in 488/1095, having been in seclusion for eleven years.
Allah had ordained it to happen thus, however. I could not have dreamed of
giving up honor and fame before I left Baghdad, but Allah had made that easy
for me. Similarly, I could never had thought of renouncing my retirement and
going back to teach again, but it too was made easy by Allah.1
Ghazālī set off for Nishapur in 499/1106 to resume his teaching position in the
Nizamiyya College. But there was a world of difference between the first time
he took up the profession and the second time. Earlier he taught to secure
honor, wealth, and position, but now he considered himself commissioned to
exhort people to purify their morals and souls. He explains the difference thus:
1 Ibid., 114-116 (summarized).
122

Abū Hāmid al-Ghazālī
I know that I have come back to my work of teaching, but it would not be
correct to call it a resumption of my earlier occupation. There is a world of
difference between the two. Before I would teach the sciences in a way calcu-
lated to bring honor, wealth, and position, and by my words and actions I led
my students to that direction. But now I want to teach them the knowledge
that helps to renounce wealth and position. Allah is fully aware that this is my
intention, and my only desire is that my present efforts lead to the purifica-
tion of my soul and the souls of other people. I do not know whether I will
reach my destination or pass away before completing my task. However, I
believe and have an unflinching conviction, on account of the knowledge of
certitude which has been given to me, that power rests with Allah alone. It is
only He who can save one from evil and profanity and lead unto the path of
sanctity and grace. I did not come here of my own accord; it was Allah who
moved me on to this place; I did not begin my work, but Allah caused me to
begin it. I beseech Allah that He first cleanse and elevate my soul before He
causes me to reform and purify the souls of others. May He reveal unto me the
righteousness which I may follow and disclose the evils which I may forsake.1
Ghazalī's Revival Efforts
Endeavors of Ghazalī for the revivification of Islam were twofold, as follows:
1.
He stemmed the tide of philosophy and of the Batini evil and began a coun-
terattack on these movements on behalf of Islam.
2. He made a critical evaluation of the religious and moral state of the Islamic
society of the time and proposed measures to reform it.
Encounters with Philosophy
The effort made till the time of Ghazali to counteract the atheistic influence
of Greek philosophy consisted merely of an apologetic vindication of Islamic
tenets. Philosophers were then taking the offensive, and the theologians of
Islam were parrying the attack. The philosophers were undermining the very
foundation of Islam, while the theologians tried to shield it. But no theologian
had the courage to strike at the roots of philosophy. In fact, no scholar of Islam
had tried to make any critical evaluation of the philosophic premises and to
besiege the aggressor in his own citadel. The tone of the dialecticians-save
only that of Abū'l-Hasan al-Ash'arī, who for his part did not have to face the
philosophers-was apologetic or at best defensive.
1 Ibid., 28-30 (summarized).
123

SAVIOURS OF ISLAMIC SPIRIT
Ghazalī was the first man to combine a profound knowledge of religious
sciences with a detailed and deep study of philosophy. He then wrote Maqasid
al-Falāsifa (The Aims of the Philosophers), in which he summed up the
salient issues of logic, metaphysics, and physics. In this book he condensed
the premises of philosophy dispassionately and explicitly. He made it clear
in the introduction to this book that mathematics is a science which does not
admit of any difference of opinion but has nothing to do with the religion,
neither in affirmation or negation of the latter. Religion does, however, come
into conflict with metaphysics. Logical syllogisms are sometimes wrong, while
there may also be differences of opinion about the terminology employed in
this branch of knowledge. Physics is sometimes mixed up with facts, uncer-
tain or dubious, for metaphysics is also included in its scope. Logic merely
subserves these sciences by lending them its terminology.
Ghazalī then wrote another book, Tahafut al-Falasifa (Incoherence of the
Philosophers). In it he criticizes, from an Islamic viewpoint, the physics and
metaphysics of the philosophical school and brings out their weaknesses and
contradictions in lucid and forceful language. We find Ghazāli expressing
himself confidently, in an elegant and penetrating style. At places he employs
satirical language that was not only effective but perhaps necessary to restore
the self-confidence of those who had been overawed by philosophy. We find
the author self-reliant and indomitable, attempting to demolish the reputa-
tion of the teachers of philosophy. He speaks of the Greek philosophers and
guides as his equals and points out their mistakes in a manner that none
before had dared to do. In order to save the day for Islam, it was impera-
tive that someone be able to strike at the foundations of philosophy rather
than merely defending the faith. Ghazali rose to the occasion, and this book
bespeaks his endeavor from cover to cover. In the introduction to Tahafut
al-Falāsifa he writes:
Nowadays we see people who appear to regard themselves intellectually
superior to the populace. These people look disdainfully on religious practices,
having learned the awe-inspiring names of some of the Greek philosophers
like Aristotle, Socrates, and Plato. They have learned from the eulogistic writing
of their admirers that the Greek scholar of old had made far-reaching discov-
eries in the fields of mathematics, logic, physics, and metaphysics, and that
these teachers were peerless in qualities of intellect and reason, but that they
had rejected the faith and its doctrines. The Greek masters saw religion as a
manmade dogma without any basis in truth. Now, following in the footsteps
124

Abū Hāmid al-Ghazālī
of their mentors, these elements too have rejected religion so that they may be
taken as the intelligent, liberal, and smart set. Simply to pass themselves off as
an elite intelligentsia, these people denigrate religion, and it is why I thought
of bringing to light the mistakes committed by the Greek philosophers in their
writings on metaphysics. I also intend to demonstrate how the premises and
principles, the notions and observations, of these philosophers are not a whit
more than child's play or, indeed, a laughing-stock.1
After giving a detailed description of the genealogy of the Greek philosophic-
cum-metaphysical concepts like logos, nous, the First Cause, or the interme-
diate agents between the Primal Cause and His creation, Ghazalī becomes
more trenchant and lively in his criticism of the philosophers. He writes:
Your doctrines and details thereof are simply assumptions and conjectures,
or, to be truthful, obscure reflections overcast with darkness. Nobody would
doubt the insanity of a man who even dreams of such nonsensical things. .. .
I really wonder how even a brainless fellow can swallow such inconsistencies,
much less those philosophers who are even inclined to hair-splitting in logi-
cal disputations.2
He expands this idea at another place, where he writes:
In venerating (the Active Intellect), these persons have completely overlooked
to accord the reverence and awe due to Allah Almighty. They have made Him
an ineffective deity, a simple essence, dealing with the universals and having no
knowledge of the particulars; he is distinct from a lifeless entity only insofar
as He possesses consciousness of His own self. Verily, Allah misguides those
who forsake the path of divine guidance and deny His revelation: "I made
them not to witness the creation of the heavens and the earth, nor their own
creation" [Q 18:51].
Those who have misgivings about the omnipotence of Allah think that
divine things can be subjected to their thought and imagination. Being
presumptuous of their Intellect, they hold that it is not necessary to follow
the prophets of Allah. That these persons should propagate, under the cover
of philosophy, such ludicrous presumptions as others would be ashamed to
dream of, is indeed natural and reasonable.3
1 Ghazālī, Tahāfut al-Falāsifa, 2-3.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid., 31.
125

SAVIOURS OF ISLAMIC SPIRIT
Effect of Tahafut al-Falasifa
Imām Ghazālī's courageous criticism and, to an extent, the denigration of
philosophy began a new chapter in the history of Islamic theology that was
later brought to successful completion by Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyya.
Tahafut al-Falasifa caused a stir in the ranks of philosophers who had to
suffer irreparable loss on account of it. However, after Ghazalī there arose
no philosopher worthy of note for a hundred years. At last, near the close
of the sixth century/twelfth, Ibn Rushd, a great admirer of Aristotle and a
spirited defender of philosophy, wrote Tahafut al-Tahafut (Incoherence of
the Incoherence), a rebuttal to Tahafut al-Falasifa. Many scholars are of the
view that if Ibn Rushd had not put up the defence on behalf of philosophy,
it would have been crippled by the hostile criticism of Ghazali. The efforts
of Ibn Rushd renewed philosophy's lease on life for another hundred years.1
Attack on the Bāținīs
Besides philosophy, the crisis caused by the Batini movement had received
Ghazalī's attention during his first stay in Baghdad, when he wrote the
Mustazhirī at the insistence of the then caliph. Ghazali made a mention of
this book in his personal account of his search for truth, Al-Munqidh min
al-Dalal. Ghazalī wrote three other treatises entitled Hujjat al-Haqq (Proof
of the Truth), Mufassil al-Khilaf (Clarifier of the Disagreement), and Qasim
al-Bāținiyya (Backbreakers of the Esoterics).2 These were perhaps also written
at this time. Two more books on the subject, Fada'ih al-Ibahiyya (Infamies of
the Permissives) and Mawahīm al-Batiniyya (Notions of the Esoterics), have
been mentioned in the last of Ghazali's writings. No one else could have faced
the Bāținīs so successfully as Ghazali did, for, besides being a scholar of both
the secular and sacred sciences, he was fully aware of the ways of mystics.
Taking shelter behind the terminology drawn from philosophy, the Batinī cult
of "esoteric meanings" was a combination of sophistry and conspiracy. For a
man like Ghazalī it was comparatively easy to smash this snare of Bāținism.
His effective answer to the challenge of Batinism discredited the sect ever after.
Ghazalī's Social Critique and the Ihya'
The second remarkable achievement of Ghazali was his evaluation
of the religious and moral state of the society from an Islamic view-
1 Tārīkh Falāsifat al-Islām, 72.
2 Ghazalī has mentioned these three titles in his Jawahir al-Qur'an, 26.
126

Abū Hāmid al-Ghazālī
point, which awakened the spirit for the re-Islamization of the com-
munity. Ihya' 'Ulum al-Din (The Revival of the Religious Sciences),
Ghazalī's magnum opus, was the result of his endeavors in this regard.
This work occupies a distinguished place among the few literary works which
have had a lasting effect in molding the moral and spiritual life of the Islamic
world. Hafız Zayn al-Din al-'Iraqi (d. 806/1404), author of the Alfiyya,1 who
brought out a collection of the hadiths quoted in the Ihya', held it up as the
foremost literary composition of Islam. 'Abd al-Ghafir al-Farisi, a contempo-
rary of Ghazalī and a student of Imam al-Haramayn, says that no book like
it had been written before. Shaykh Muhammad Gazarūnī declared that if all
the sciences were effaced completely, he could revive them with the help of
the Ihya'.2 Hafiz Ibn al-Jawzī differed with Ghazalī on many issues, but he
acknowledged the popularity and matchless sincerity of the Ihya' and wrote
a summary of it under the caption Minhaj al-Qașidīn.
The Ihya' was written at a time when Ghazali had returned home after
his more than ten years of seclusion and meditation. He now wanted to dis-
seminate his message of reform and rectitude. Reflecting the tremendous
sincerity and heroic sacrifice, heartfelt certitude, and ardent zeal of the author
to revive the true faith, the Ihya' presents a striking example. Shiblī Nu manī
writes in Al-Ghazālī:
In Baghdad he felt an irresistible urge to embark on the quest for truth. He
proceeded to study each religion but still remained unsatisfied. At last he
turned to mysticism, but it was something to be experienced in the recesses
of one's heart rather than to be studied, and the first step toward it was puri-
fication of the heart and transformation of the self. The preoccupations of
Ghazalī, however, left no room for it. What did honor and fame, sermons and
debates, have to do with the purification of heart and soul? Obviously, it was
a path that leads to wilderness.
At last, donning a mendicant's habit, he left Baghdad and took to wandering.
After a long period spent alternately in complete seclusion and meditation,
he gained access to divine manifestation. He would have spent the rest of his
life lost in spiritual visions, but witnessing the contamination of religion and
morals all around him-a malady from which the wealthy and the destitute,
the laity and the elite, the learned and the unlearned, were suffering alike-he
began to give expression to his experiences and convictions. He could not
1 This is a work on hadith theory also known as Al-Tabsira wa 'I-Tadhkira fi 'Ulum al-Hadith.
2 'Abd al-Qadir al-Hasanī, Tarif al-Ahya' bi Fada'il al-Ihya', 1:14.
127

SAVIOURS OF ISLAMIC SPIRIT
bear with equanimity the descent of the mentors of faith into a cesspool of
crass materialism. He wrote the book in these circumstances. As he himself
writes in its preface:
"I found every one hankering after material gains. People had become for-
getful of the eternal salvation, while the scholars of religion, who were guides
to the right path, were not to be found any longer. There remained only those
who had lost their souls to worldly temptations. These people had led every-
one to suppose that knowledge consists simply in the debates and arguments
by which they spread their fame, or the ornate sermons by which they held
the people spellbound, or the legal opinion by which they sat in judgment to
settle the disputes of others. The knowledge that was required to illuminate
the path leading to the world to come had thus completely disappeared. I
could not endure the state of affairs and had ultimately to sound the alarm."1
Ghazāli's Critique of Society
Ghazāli's object was to bring about a moral and spiritual transformation in
the people of his time. To this end, he wanted to create an awareness of the
ills and weaknesses the Muslims and their religious and intellectual leaders
were suffering from; to tell them how the devil of earthly passions had taken
hold of the different sections of society; and to let them realize what factors
were responsible for diverting their attention from the true content of faith
to its outer forms, rituals, and customs, thus making them oblivious of the
eternal life and the will and pleasure of Allah. In order, therefore, to achieve
the end he had in view, Ghazali undertook a detailed analysis of the intellec-
tual and moral approach of contemporary society toward life and the world.
He highlighted the vices of the different sections, defined the aims and the
methods necessary to achieve those objectives, delineated the individual and
communal obligations of the people, brought out the distinguishing features
and differences between secular and sacred sciences, invited the attention
of the affluent and ruling classes to their shortcomings, criticized the unjust
laws and rules promulgated by the state, and exhorted them to give up their
un-Islamic ways, customs, and practices. It was thus the first detailed socio-
logical study in Islam, and it courageously and poignantly brought out the
social and moral ills of society and suggested measures for its reform and
transformation into a healthy community.
1
Shiblī Nu mānī, Al-Ghazālī, 63-64.
128

Abū Hāmid al-Ghazālī
The Religious Scholars
Ghazalī held the religious scholars responsible for the general religious and
moral degeneration of the Muslim peoples. To him, religious scholars were
the salt of the earth; if they went astray, nothing could keep the people on
the right path. An Arab poet has expressed the same idea in these words:
O group of reciters, O salt of the earth.
If the salt itself gets contaminated, what is there to purify it?
Complaining that the prevailing widespread vices were traceable to the
negligence of religious teachers, Ghazālī writes:
The third reason, which really constitutes an incurable disease, is that there are
patients but no physicians who are available for their treatment. The scholars
are the physicians, but these days they are themselves confined to the sickbed
and unable to cure others.
Ghazalī offers the same reason for the waywardness of rulers and kings. He
writes:
In short, the debasement of the people proceeds from the corruption of their
rulers, who get perverted on account of the moral decline of the scholars of
religion. Had there been no self-seeking judges and religious scholars, the
rulers would not have become so depraved, for they would have had to be
mindful of the warnings of the scholars.1
The neglect by religious scholars of the time to enjoin right and forbid
wrong, as the servants of old used to do, was severely criticized by Ghazāli.
He deplored the timidity of the religious teachers of his time, who were not
courageous enough to uphold what was right in the face of kings because they
had been infected by love of wealth, power, and honor. After citing numerous
instances where the past scholars had fearlessly stood against the injustice of
powerful despots and tyrannical rulers, he says in the Ihya':
This is how the learned enjoined the right and forbade the wrong. They did
not care at all for the pomp and glory of the kings, for they used to put their
trust in Allah alone and were confident that He would protect them. They
were ever willing to lay down their lives for the sake of a righteous cause, if
Allah so desired. Whatever they said was taken to heart, for their intentions
were pure, and their spotless sincerity molded even the hard-hearted brutes.
1 Ghazalī, Ihya' 'Ulum al-Din, 2:132.
129

SAVIOURS OF ISLAMIC SPIRIT
But now the earthly temptations have made them dumb, and even if they
speak out it has no effect because they lack sincerity. They can be effective
even now if they cultivate selfless detachment and earnestness. People have
become depraved because of their rulers, and the rulers have too because of
the learned who have declined morally on account of their love for wealth,
power, and honor. One who has been infected by worldly temptations can-
not admonish even the lowly and the poor, much less the nobles and kings.1
Most of the religious scholars of his day, as Ghazali pointed out, had given
themselves up to hair-splitting on juristic issues and cavilling at real or imagi-
nary problems. In social gatherings and religious meetings, royal courts and
scholarly seminars, specious contentions of a juristic nature had come to be
regarded as an inevitable intellectual diversion. It had become such a rage
in those times that in their craze to arm themselves for a knock-out victory
in debates and disputations, the scholars neglected all other branches of
learning, including even the religious sciences-the knowledge necessary for
spiritual and moral rectitude or to prepare oneself for life in the Hereafter.
Ghazalī protests this state of affairs in the Ihya' in these words:
If any jurist is asked about the virtues and vices like patience and thankful-
ness, fear and awe, envy and malice, hypocrisy and deception, contentment
and earnestness, or how to avoid hankering after the praise and respect of
others, he would not be able to give any answer, although he ought to know
these as the life in the world to come depends on them. On the other hand, if
you ask him about [the juridical rulings of ] li'an (mutual imprecation),2 zihār
(incestuous comparison),3 sabq (riding competition), or ramy (shooting), he
will give a detailed description of each, even though one seldom comes across
these issues; and if anybody does need a juristic opinion on these matters,
one can easily obtain it in every town. These scholars thus devote their entire
time and energy in learning and teaching the details of similar insignificant
issues but remain oblivious of the knowledge essential for a religious teacher.
1 Ibid., 2:312.
2 A procedure in which the husband accuses his wife of adultery without evidence, so they
both swear four oaths, by which he invokes a curse (la'na) on himself and she invokes the wrath
of Allah upon herself, if they should be telling a lie. This allows him to reject the paternity of the
child from himself.
3 Zihār was a pre-Islamic form of divorce in which the husband compared his wife to his
mother's back (or that of any unmarriageable kin), essentially indicating that she is unlawful for
him just as his mother is. This is a form of oath that needs to be expiated before the husband can
cohabit with his wife.
130

Abū Hāmid al-Ghazālī
If these scholars are ever asked about it, their reply is that they are engaged
in acquiring a religious knowledge which constitutes a communal obligation
(fard kifaya) enjoined by the Shari'a. They are really keeping their own selves
in the dark and deceiving others, for as everybody knows, he who wants to
acquit himself of a communal obligation should first discharge the obligations
enjoined on him personally.
Also, there are many other communal obligations which take precedence,
as, for example, we have many non-Muslim physicians in the city whose
evidence is not acceptable under the Shari'a in religious matters requiring
medical opinion. But we do not find any turning to the study of medicine.
Students overcrowd the classrooms of the sciences pertaining to jurisprudence,
logic, and dialects, although there are hundreds of jurisconsults who are ever
willing to let one have their legal opinions. I fail to understand how these
scholars can defend their engagement in a communal obligation which is
being already performed by numerous scholars while disregarding another
obligation which is not being attended by anyone. Is there any reason for it
except that the study of medicine cannot help them to secure trusteeship of
charitable trusts, enforcement of wills, guardianship of orphans and man-
agement of their property, appointment to the posts of judges and official
jurists, respect and honor in governmental circles or precedence over their
compatriots, friends, and foes?1
At another place in the Ihya' he writes:
There is not a town in which several matters do not assume the position of
joint or communal obligations, but there is none to look after these or pay any
heed to them. Take, for Instance, the study of medicine. There are a number
of towns in which there is no practicing physician whose evidence is admis-
sible in law, but these lack an interest in this profession. Similar is the case
with the obligation incumbent on all Muslims to enjoin the right and forbid
the wrong (but it is being overlooked by everybody).2
Ghazalī laments people's general lack of interest in and apathy toward the
tenets of faith and calls attention to the need for spreading literacy and dis-
seminating the knowledge of religion. After emphasizing this critical need
for spreading religious knowledge, he continues:
For anyone who is concerned about his religion, teaching and spreading
1 Ibid., 1:19.
2 Ibid., 1:38.
131

SAVIOURS OF ISLAMIC SPIRIT
knowledge of the faith-which is also a joint obligation-is so consuming
an occupation that it would not permit him to go into unnecessary juristic
details and waste time with scholastic hair-splitting or other such trivialities.1
Ghazalī explained why wrangling over disputed issues had come to assume
such importance with scholars of his time, who, in due course, had begun
to devote their time and energy to fruitless quibbling. Tracing the history of
these vain disputations, he writes:
The caliphs succeeding the Prophet were jurists, competent to give juristic
opinions in all matters, and in this task they seldom required the help of
other Companions of the Prophet . The learned among the Companions,
therefore, occupied themselves in the pursuit of salvation in the world to
come, and if they were ever asked for a legal opinion, they would refer the
inquirer to another jurist and themselves remain absorbed in the remem-
brance of Allah. Historians have preserved numerous instances of this kind.
But thereafter, undeserving and incompetent persons came to preside over
the Islamic commonwealth. They were not fit to give legal opinions or settle
people's disputes and were therefore compelled to depend on jurisconsults
for the administration of justice. The scholars among the descendants of the
Prophet's Companions
generally followed in the footsteps of the scholars
of old; they were aware of the true content of the faith, were selfless and
detached, and hence avoided the company of rulers and kings. The Umayyad
and Abbasid caliphs had to look around for them and implore them to accept
the offices of jurist and judge. The masses of the time, who witnessed such
solicitations by kings and the devout jurists' cool disdain toward them, thought
that the study of juristic sciences would be the easiest way to acquire riches
and honor and gain access to the palace entourage or the nobility. These
elements themselves applied for governmental offices and maneuvered to
win the favor of rulers and administrators in the hope of achieving worldly
success. Some of them gained their end while others licked the dust, but
even those who did succeed had to humble themselves by applying for these
offices. They had to come down from the exalted station of scholars to that
of commoners. Another result was that scholars who were earlier implored
to accept these offices began to offer themselves as candidates. Earlier they
were honored for their selfless detachment from the ruling circles, but now
lost their respect by becoming henchmen to kings and rulers. A few scholars
in every age, however, were exceptions to the rule.
1 Ibid., 1:37-38.
132

Abū Hāmid al-Ghazālī
In former times, analogical deductions drawn up on legal or theologi-
cal questions, in accordance with the principles of jurisprudence and the
teaching of the Shari'a, were needed primarily to meet the requirements of
administration and justice. In due course, however, nobles and administrators,
too, cultivated an interest in these matters and began to encourage scholars
to discuss these issues in their presence. In view of the interest taken by the
elite in these discussions, people began to devote themselves to the study of
dialectics. Numerous treatises came to be written on the science of disputation.
Rules were developed for these debates, and gradually the wrangling turned
into a syllogistic art form. These people tried to justify their endeavors on
the grounds that their aim was to protect the Scripture and the Sunna and
to oppose innovation and deviation. Those who had earlier been engaged in
giving legal opinions made the similar claim that they intended to serve the
faith and the people by helping them settle their disputes.
A few rulers and administrators of later times undoubtedly looked with
disfavor upon dialectics and disputation, for they thought that these polem-
ics gave rise to academic orthodoxy and quarrelsome disputes, and not
infrequently even to violent strife and bloodshed. On the other hand, there
were also nobles and chiefs desirous of finding out which of the two schools
of Islamic jurisprudence, the Hanafi or Shafi'i, was nearer to the right path.
These elements encouraged discussion and debate on juristic issues. The
scholars in their entourage accordingly put aside all dialectical quibbling on
other issues and took up the controversies between these two juristic schools,
overlooking the differences of opinion between other jurists such as Malik ibn
Anas, Sufyan al-Thawrī, and Ahmad ibn Hanbal, simply because their masters
were not interested in their opinions. Laying a claim to the refinement and
amplification of the Islamic legal corpus, and to the formulation of principles
for analogical deduction, these scholars compiled innumerable dissertations
on the subject, cultivated logical syllogisms, and developed it into a science of
rationalization. They are still preoccupied with this vocation, and only Allah
knows to what extent they will go. Thus, the reason for the undue interest
taken by the scholars in these controversies and contentious ratiocinations is
what we have stated above. If the nobility or the powers that be were to take
interest in the juristic differences of schools other than those of Abū Hanifa
and Shafi'ī, these people would immediately start quibbling over the questions
relating to those schools as well. And they would still claim that their aim is
simply to acquire knowledge and to seek the pleasure of Allah.1
1 Ibid., 1:38.
133

SAVIOURS OF ISLAMIC SPIRIT
After tracing the origins of contentious debate, Ghazāli sets forth in some
detail the ill effects of these quarrels. He also describes his own experience,
as he himself had earlier taken a keen interest in such polemics.1
Further misunderstanding sprang from the terminology that was being
used for the sciences and their problematic nuances cultivated in Ghazāli's
time. The same classical words or phrases occurring in the Qur'an, hadith of
the Prophet , or the sayings or works of his Companions , were being
widely used for these sciences. To give a few examples, in those times, the
word fiqh (positive law) was being commonly used for the intricate and
hypothetical details of legal questions as well as for the differences in legal
opinion regarding such issues; 'ilm (knowledge) was being used to describe
not only sacred but non-sacred learning as well; polemical theology and
philosophical inquiry were known as tawhid (divine oneness); tadhkīr
(reminding of acts of devotion to Allah) was the name assigned to all sorts
of lectures replete with fantastical tales; and hikma (wisdom) was used for
occult and uncommon practices. With their indiscriminate use the peculiar
sense conveyed by these terms in the context of the Qur'an and the Sunna
had come to be associated with these new sciences as well. Thus, the Qur'anic
phrase "So that they may understand religion" (Q 9:122) and the hadith "Allah
grants understanding of religion to those He intends good for" were applied
to juristic quibbling and hair-splitting; the divine tidings in "Those granted
wisdom (in religion) have been bestowed a great favor" was co-opted to
philosophy and polemical theology2 of the fifth/eleventh century; and the
verse "Remind, for you are but one who reminds" was employed for the vile
sermons of ignorant and misguided preachers. Ghazali explained how these
words were being used out of their context to mean something they were
never intended to convey. He traced the original meaning of these words and
phrases, which had not only been misplaced but also differed widely from
the sense conveyed during his time. Ghazali's analysis was as instructive as
it was helpful for removing the misconceptions that had been created by the
careless and indiscriminate use of religious terminology then being used for
the furtherance of new sciences.3
1 Ibid., 1:40-43.
2 Hence, this verse can still be found on the covers of many peripatetic philosophy textbooks,
and even textbooks of Unani medicine (tibb).
3 Ihya', 1:28, 34.
134

Abū Hāmid al-Ghazālī
Critique of the Rulers and Kings
Ghazalī held that, along with the religious scholars, kings and rulers, admin-
istrators and nobles were also responsible for the widespread moral and
spiritual degeneration of the people. Two hundred year earlier, Abdullah
ibn al-Mubarak had expressed in poetic form what Ghazāli felt about kings
and nobles:
And who corrupts religion but kings, hermits, and evil scholars?
Giving no mind to his personal safety, Ghazalī stood up against the unjust
ways of the powerful despots and autocratic rulers who considered themselves
above every law. It was common practice among scholars of those days to
accept donations or stipends granted by the sitting ruler. But Ghazalī was
courageous enough to denounce these awards as ill gotten. He declared that
these grants were at best doubtful and at worst prohibited. He writes, "The
revenues accruing to kings these days are mostly prohibited, for they seldom
have a lawful income, and if they have any, it is but trifling." He further says:
The wealth at the disposal of kings in our times is prohibited either in its
entirety or its majority. There is nothing surprising in this because we find
nowadays no trace of lawful sources like the alms or spoils of war. No income
from these sources generally reaches the king. Of the lawful sources, only the
protection tax (jizya) now remains, but numerous unjust means are employed
in the recovery of these dues that are not allowed by the Shari'a. The officials
of the state exceed the prescribed limits both on the amounts to be recovered
and the persons to be assessed for the protection tax. The conditions laid
down for assessment of this tax are also disregarded. Apart from these sources
of income, the coffers of the state are also filled with riches extracted from
Muslims far in excess of the tributes for the lands they hold-confiscations,
illegal gratifications, and other similar taxes collected even more mercilessly
than the protection tax.1
Ghazalī maintained that since the riches amassed by the kings were either
unlawful or at least dubious from the standpoint of the Shari'a, it was advisable
that no grant or donation out of it be accepted by a scholar. Such an income,
he held, was not conducive to the spiritual advancement of the recipient. He
further argued that instances of scholars accepting royal grants in the past
1
Ibid., 2:120, 122.
135

SAVIOURS OF ISLAMIC SPIRIT
could undoubtedly be cited, but that was a world altogether different from
his own. In this connection he writes:
The despotic rulers of the past, being nearer in time to the Rightly-Guided
Caliphs, were at least conscious of their tyrannical ways and hence ever
eager to win the favor of the Companions of the Prophet and their associ-
ates and descendants. Since these rulers of old were anxious that their favors
be accepted by devout scholars, they made these presentations of their own
accord and without any strings attached. They even expressed gratitude for
the acceptance of their grants. The devout, for their part, accepted these pre-
sentations only to distribute them among the poor and needy. At the same
time, these mentors of old never sided with the rulers in the furtherance of
their political ends. They never paid visits to kings and chieftains, nor did they
ever encourage the latter to call upon them. It was not infrequently that they
warned the kings for their irreligious actions or even cursed them for their
tyrannical ways. These scholars thus accepted the presentation of their rulers
because there was no danger of any harmful effect to the faith on account of it.
Kings nowadays, however, have only such scholars on their payrolls as
they hope to win over to their side for certain ulterior motives or as would be
willing to join their entourages and sing their praises. The vices flowing out
of the acceptance of such favors are many: First, the recipient has to endure
humiliation. Second, he has to pay visits to the donor. Third, he has to lavish
praise upon the grantor. Fourth, he is required to help the grantor in real-
izing his ends. Fifth, he has to dance in attendance upon the ruler like other
courtiers. Sixth, he has always to express gratitude and assure the grantor
of his help. And seventh, he has to hold his tongue over the tyrannies and
misdeeds of kings. Rulers nowadays would not extend their help to anybody
who is not willing to accept even one of these conditions, no matter if he be
a scholar of Shafi'i's fame.
It is for these reasons that it is not lawful now for anyone to accept dona-
tions from kings, even if one knows them to have derived their income through
lawful means. There is absolutely no justification for accepting grants out of
revenues gained through prohibited or even doubtful means. Now, if anybody
still unashamedly accepts the donations from these rulers and quotes the
Companions of the Prophet and their successors as a precedent, he perhaps
considers the angels in the same category as blacksmiths, for he cannot avoid
waiting upon the rulers or even their chiefs and officials and playing second
fiddle to them. And these are all sins.
I have now explained the sources of lawful and unlawful income accruing
136

Abū Hāmid al-Ghazālī
to kings. If anybody still deems it practicable to obtain a grant drawn out of
lawful revenues, and he also deserves the same or gets it without in any way
asking for it or having to ingratiate himself to the king or his chieftains, and
the donation does not depend on any service to be rendered in return, then
it may be lawful to accept it. But I would still advise in favor of refusal if only
for the evils likely to follow its acceptance.1
Ghazalī did not merely advise abandoning the donations and grants of kings;
he went even further to stress that one ought completely to disassociate
oneself from them and detest their tyrannical and despotic ways. He writes
in the Ihya':
One should be so completely cut off from kings that he never comes across
them. This entails-and indeed safety lies in it-that one detest them for their
tyranny. He should never entreat Allah's blessings for them nor praise them,
nor else seek acquaintance of their courtiers. One should not even desire to
know anything about them.
We are living in a democratic age wherein freedom of speech and expression
has been proclaimed around the world. It is therefore difficult to visualize the
amount of courage Ghazali had to muster and the grave danger he exposed
himself to by openly preaching disassociation with the rulers or advising
refusal of their grants, and criticizing them for their tyrannical and un-Islamic
policies in social, political, and fiscal matters. For despotic and autocratic
rulers, as kings generally were in those days, even the slightest criticism of
the state or its policies or officials was sufficient as a mark of treason, and the
heads of eminent scholars and reputed personages rolled at the merest wish
of those tyrants. However, throwing all considerations of personal safety to
the winds, Ghazali preached and practiced what he considered to be right
and never faltered from the duty of severely admonishing the arrogant kings
of his time.
Sultan Sanjar, the son of the Seljuq sultan Malikshah, was the governor
of Khurasan. Once Ghazalī happened to see him in his court. Addressing
Sanjar, he said before his courtiers:
It is indeed regrettable that the necks of other Muslims are breaking under the
crushing burden of your tyranny, while those of your horses are overburdened
with expensive harnesses.2
1 Ibid. 2:123.
2 Ghazālī, Maktūbāt, 19.
137

SAVIOURS OF ISLAMIC SPIRIT
Muhammad, the elder brother of Sanjar, succeeded his father Malikshah.
Ghazali wrote a detailed letter in the form of a treatise exhorting him to
inculcate awe of Allah, fulfill his obligations as a king, and work for the bet-
terment of his people.1
Administration was generally in the hands of ministers in Ghazāli's time.
He therefore paid more attention to them than to the Seljuq kings for bringing
about administrative reform. He wrote detailed letters and directives call-
ing their attention to the mismanagement, maladministration, inefficiency,
illegal exhortation, and high-handedness of state officials. Ghazāli reminded
them of their responsibility before Allah and called their attention to the
fate earlier tyrannical rulers and administrators had met as a consequence
of their oppressive administrative policies. The letters Ghazali wrote to the
ministers of Seljuq kings reflect his personal courage, his desire for exposing
the truth, and the effectiveness of his sharp expression.
In one of his letters to a minister, Fakhr al-Mulk, he wrote:
You should know that this city [Tus] had been laid waste by famine and
tyranny. Everyone was scared by the news of your presence in Esfarayen
(Isfarayin) and Damghan. Farmers sold their produce, and hooligans behaved
nicely with the populace. Now that you are far away, fear has taken flight from
these people. The bully has again taken heart, and the farmers and grocers are
indulging in black-marketeering. Anybody sending you a report contrary to
what I have stated is not your well-wisher. . .. Verily, the solemn invocation of
the oppressed in Tus would surely be answered by the Lord. I counseled the
governor of Tūs, but he did not pay any heed to me until an example was made
out of him by divine justice. . .. My solemn admonition would undoubtedly
appear distasteful to you, but I would not have dared to write this letter if I
had not cast all temptations of earthly favors out of my heart. Pay heed to
me, for you would not be counseled like this by anyone after me. Only those
can admonish you who do not allow their selfishness to conceal the truth.2
In a letter to another minister, Mujīr al-Din, he says:
Now that the tyranny has reached its limits, it has become incumbent on you
to give succor to the oppressed. I was a witness to this state of affairs for a
year or so. I then migrated from Țūs in order to avoid casting a glance over
1 This is called Nasīhat al-Muluk and is in Persian.
2 Maktūbāt, 36-38.
138

Abū Hāmid al-Ghazālī
those ignoble oppressors. Now that I have returned to Tus, I find that the
oppression is still continuing.1
After drawing Mujir al-Din's attention to the despicable fate met by earlier
ministers, Ghazālī continues:
The ministers before you met a fate which none had met before them. But
now I see oppression and destruction that I had never witnessed before. You
may not be pleased with this state of affairs, but when these oppressors are
called up on the Day of Judgement, everyone responsible for their tyranny,
even in the remotest possible way, will be asked to render an explanation
for it. The Muslims of this place are extremely aggrieved. The officials have
collected quite a substantial amount from the populace, many times more
than the money sent by you for distribution to the poor, but it has not been
remitted to the king. These people have misappropriated the entire amount.2
Other Classes of Muslim Society
Ghazalī had also made a deep study of the religious and moral life of the
other sections of society besides the scholars, kings, and chieftains. He has
left a detailed description of numerous innovations and deviations, customs
and rites-in short, all aspects of mundane life which had somehow or other
found a place in the life of the different sections of contemporary society. It is
remarkable that, in addition to being a profound academic scholar of religion,
Ghazalī was also such a keen observer of society that no aspect of popular life
escaped his attention. He devotes one section of the Ihya' to such customs as
violate the dictates of the Shari'a but do not apparently seem to do so. In this
section he leaves untouched no aspect of individual or communal life-from
the mosque to the market, from the baths to the social spaces-and enumer-
ates the practices that are prohibited and ought to be given up.3
Another section of the book deals with those people who were suffering
from one or another misconception that impeded the improvement of their
character. This section is concerned with the people who suffer from differ-
ent types of self-deceptions, weaknesses, fallacies, illusions, and paradoxes.
The survey includes the affluent, nobles, scholars, mystics, and similar other
classes of rank and distinction, exhibiting a penetrating insight into their
mental and emotional life to be expected only from an expert psychologist.
1
Maktūbāt, 62-63.
2 Maktūbāt, 67.
3
Ihya', 2:294-299.
139

SAVIOURS OF ISLAMIC SPIRIT
His study uncovers misgivings and illusions which the people concerned
would hardly have been aware of themselves.
Scholars in Ghazalī's time, on the whole, had developed a kind of extrem-
ism in the cultivation and practice of their disciplines that obscured the
essence of true faith from view. Jurists stretched their legal quibbling too far
to include all sorts of futile juristic issues; dialecticians deemed it worthwhile
to engage in specious reasoning and irrelevant polemics; hadith scholars
busied themselves with unnecessary researches into the terms and phrases
(and their derivatives) used in hadiths; meanwhile mystics considered it an
act of devotion to commit the writings of their masters to memory. Ghazāli
vigorously criticized all these people and brought out succinctly the mis-
conceptions under which they were laboring. Summing up the discussion
in this regard, he writes:
The secular sciences pertaining to mathematics, medicine, and other useful
arts do not produce so much self-deception among their students as is born
out of the religious sciences. This is because nobody ever thinks of the former
branches of learning as a means of attaining salvation in the Hereafter, whereas
the study itself of religious sciences, apart from its true aim and the ultimate
result desired of it, is very often taken as leading to salvation.1
Along with the religious scholars, Ghazali brought the pious and the mys-
tics too under the focus of his criticism. In highlighting their mistakes and
misconceptions, self-deceptions and the show of assumed piety, Ghazāli
disclosed how a number of devotional practices were really unimportant
and worthless, and that the motive behind several of these devotional acts
was not a sincere desire to serve Allah but simply to satisfy one's own self or
others or to seek adoration and honor.2
Turning to the affluent and well-to-do sections of the society, Ghazāli
makes certain pertinent observations of far-reaching importance:
There are many among the men of means who are too liberal in spending their
wealth on the performance of hajj. They set out for the pilgrimage regularly
year after year as if they have none hungry or in want among their neighbors.
'Abdullah ibn Mas ud & said that in later times quite a large number of people
would perform the hajj unnecessarily, simply because they would find it easy
to travel and would have enough to spend; but they would return from the
1 Ibid., 3:343.
2 Ibid., 3:345-350.
140