النص المفهرس

reliable and had a more truthful transmission.
Fatwas of the Followers
It is clear that Malik did not consider the statements of the Followers to
occupy the same position in the Sunna as those of the Companions; but he
did take account of the positions of some of the Followers because of their
knowledge of fiqh or their truthfulness or their exalted qualities of character.
These included such people as 'Umar ibn 'Abdu'l-'Aziz, Sa'id ibn al-
Musayyab, Ibn Shihab az-Zuhri, Nafi' the client of Ibn 'Umar, and others
who were accurate in transmission of knowledge and had high proficiency in
fiqh. He accepted a fatwa from them when its basis was a known sunna, or
was in accordance with the practice of the people of Madina, or with the
position of the majority of scholars. Sometimes he was satisfied with their
ijtihad when he had confidence in it and did not find anything to contradict it.
Consensus (Ijma')
Malik, may Allah be pleased with him, was probably the one of the four
Imams who most frequently mentioned consensus and used it as evidence. If
you open the Mu watt a ', you will find in many places that the ruling in
the case mentions that it is "the generally agreed-on way of doing things,"
and that was considered to be an evidence which was sufficiently
authoritative for him to give fatwa by it.
Let us see what Malik himself says in explanation of his use of the term
'agreed-on'. We find that he says in the Muwatta':
As for 'the agreed-upon practice', it is something that the people of fiqh and
knowledge agree upon without dispute. This is the agreement of the people of
this community who contract agreements (ahl al-hall w a ' 1 - 'a q d ) in any
matter. By agreement we mean agreement in word, action or belief.
That is the consensus which Malik took as an authoritative evidence and
which you see often used in the Muwatta' in resolving questions about which
there is no unequivocal text or when he believes that the text needs to be
amplified, or when the text is an ayat whose meaning is of the apparent sort

(dhahir) which admits of interpretation and specification. It is also clear that
consensus in the view of Malik is the consensus of the people of Madina, and
this leads us on to the practice of the people of Madina.
The Practice of the People of Madina
Malik, may Allah be pleased with him, considered the practice of the people
of Madina to be a legal source on which he relied in his fatwas. That is why
he often said, after mentioning the traditions and h a d i t h, "the way of doing
things generally agreed-on among us." Sometimes, when no text or other
authority existed, Malik used the practice of the people of Madina as an
evidence to be relied on absolutely. His previously mentioned letter to al-
Layth ibn Sa'd shows the great extent to which he relied on it and his
objection to those who followed anything other than the practice of the
People of Madina.
It is clear that Malik was not the first person to use the practice of the people
of Madina as an authoritative evidence. Malik's shaykh, Rabi'a, mentioned
the method and said, "A thousand from a thousand is better than one from
one." Malik said, "The learned men among the Followers quoted ha dith s
which had been conveyed to them from others and they said, 'We are not
ignorant of this, but the common practice is different.""
He also said, "I saw Muhammad ibn Abi Bakr ibn 'Amr ibn Hazm who was a
qadi. His brother 'Abdullah knew many hadiths and was a truthful man.
When Muhammad gave a judgement and there was a hadith contrary to it, I
heard 'Abdullah criticise him, saying, 'Isn't there a hadith which says such
and such? 'Yes,' he replied. 'Then what is the matter with you? Why don't
you give judgement by it?' asked his brother. 'Where are the people in
respect to it?' replied Muhammad, meaning 'what is the consensus of action
on it in Madina?' He meant that the practice outweighs the hadith in that
instance." (Madarik, p. 38)
So it can be seen that Malik, may Allah be pleased with him, did not originate
that method. Rather he travelled a path which others among the Followers
and the people of knowledge before him had followed. He became renowned
for it, however, because of the great number of fatwas he was asked for and

because some of his f a t w a s were contrary to h a d i t h s which he also
related. He became the most famous of those who accepted the practice of the
people of Madina as an authoritative source and so the method was ascribed
to him; but the truth is that in that respect he was a follower, not an
originator.
Analogy (Qiyas)
Malik, may Allah be pleased with him, issued fatwas for more than fifty
years. People came to him from the East and West to ask for fatwa. Since
questions are endless and events occur every day, it is necessary for
understanding of the texts to go beyond their immediate significance to
recognition of their immediate and further aims and to perception of their
indications and suggestions, so that the extent of their comprehensiveness
may be correctly ascertained. Only then is it possible to understand what lies
behind the judgements made by the Companions in cases where there was no
well-known s u n n a and which could not be included within the meaning of
the literal text, even though the text might indirectly indicate to it.
When no direct precedent was available to him Malik used to make analogies
based on judgements derived directly from texts in the Qur'an and
judgements derived directly from h a d i t h s of the Prophet. The Muwatta'
contains many examples of that. We find that at the beginning of the chapter
he presents those a y a t s a n d hadiths which he considers to be directly
relevant to the subject in hand and then after that he gives secondary rulings,
connecting like to like and similar to similar.
He also drew analogies based on the consensus of the people of Madina
because, as we have seen, he considered that to be the Sunna. In the
Muwatta' he mentions the 'generally agreed-on way of doing things' and
then gives secondary rulings in situations where there is similarity in the
circumstances surrounding the questions about which he was asked for a
fatwa.
Malik also used to utilise the f a t w a s of the Companions as a basis for
analogy, as we saw in the case of the wife of the missing husband in which he
followed the f a t w a of 'Umar about the divorced woman who was not

aware of having been taken back by her husband, which was confirmed by
the agreement of the people of Madina on similar cases.
The fugaha' of the Maliki school use analogy but always subject it to the
principle of bringing about the best interests of people and averting harm
from them. So even if their analogy is absolutely correct, they do not proceed
with it if that would prevent benefit or entail harm. They relax the general
rules and leave them for the sake of specific benefits. That is part of istihsan.
Istihsan (Discretion)
Ibn al-Qasim related from Malik that he said that istihsan was nine-tenths of
knowledge. Malik used analogy but made it subject to general and partial
benefit, so he only applied it when he was sure that there was no harm in its
application; otherwise he left it. For Malik it was a basic rule that analogy is
subject to benefit. That is why the underlying principle of Maliki fiqh is
benefit, as we will explain.
Judgements based on i s t i h s a n or which make it the deciding factor when
weighing up different proofs are numerous in the Maliki school, as ash-
Shatibi says in al-Muwafaqat. One example of this is loans. A loan might be
considered to be usury because a dirham is exchanged for a dirham for a
period of time but it is permissible under the principle of istihsan because of
the way people are helped by it. If loans had remained forbidden they might
have suffered great hardship.
Two things are evident from examining the questions in which judgements
are based on istihsan.
· Istihsan is used for fatwa in questions, not on the basis of its being a rule,
but rather on the basis of its being an exception to the rule or according to the
Maliki definition of consideration: relaxation of the rule is a temporary
principle as distinct from a universal principle. We saw an example of this in
the fatwa about accepting witnesses who do not have good character in a land
in which no witnesses of good character can be found and as mentioned
above when a loan is permitted to avert distress and hardship. In these
matters and those like them, istihsan is a relaxation of the general rule which,

if followed in the particular instance in question, would lead to harm. Istihsan
averts that harm.
. Istihsan is most often used when the application of strict analogy would
necessarily entail distress. So istihsan in the Maliki school, as in the Hanafi
school, is equivalent to analogy, even though the methods of the two schools
in reaching it are different. Each of them proceeds according to its legal logic,
and istihsan in the Maliki school aims to avert any distress arising from
following analogy through to its logical conclusion. Asbagh, who was
probably the most prolific exponent of istih san, said, "People who go to
extremes in making analogy are in danger of abandoning the Sunna. Istihsan
is the foundation of knowledge." (ash-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, vol. 4, p. 118)
Malik further refined the principle of istihsan under the heading of masalih
mursala (considerations of public interest) and g a v e fatwas based on it.
Masalih Mursala (Considerations of Public Interest)
The great majority of scholars of ethics incline to the view that the governing
measure of all that is good and evil in any action is the benefit or harm which
stems from it. If the action contains some advantage and does not cause harm
to anyone, then it is good and performing it is an undoubted virtue. If it is an
action which contains benefit for some people and harm for others, there is a
conflict and clash between benefit and harm. In this case the good lies in
abandoning a slight harm to obtain a greater benefit, or in abandoning a
temporary benefit for a lasting benefit, or in abandoning an uncertain benefit
to obtain a definite one.
Islamic fiqh in its entirety is based on the best interests of the community.
That which contains benefit is desired and there is evidence for that, and that
which is harmful is prohibited and there are numerous proofs for that as well.
This is a confirmed principle which is agreed upon by the f u q a h a ' of the
Muslims. None of them have ever alleged that the Islamic Shari'a brought
anything which is not in people's best interests and none of them have ever
said that there is anything harmful in any law or judgement within the Shari'a
which has been legislated for the Muslims.

So the manifest principle governing the legality of customs and traditions in
the eyes of the Shari'a is whether or not they are beneficial in real terms. But
what is the criterion used in the Shari'a to ascertain whether or not a
particular matter contains benefit? To discover that we have to ascertain
exactly what it is that makes a particular action permitted or forbidden.
What, then, is the nature of the benefit which makes an action acceptable in
the eyes the Islamic Shari'a? It is that which coincides with its goals, and the
goal of the Islamic Shari'a is to preserve the five things whose preservation is
agreed to be obligatory: life, sanity, property, progeny and honour. All
religions agree on the obligation to preserve these things and have that point
in common. All rational people concur that society is based on protecting and
preserving these things.
In taking masalih mursala as an independent legal principle, Malik was a
follower and not an innovator. He found the Companions of the Messenger of
Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, doing various things after
his death which had not been done while he was alive.
· They collected the Noble Qur'an into a bound book - something which had
not been done during the lifetime of the Messenger - because of the inherent
benefit in it, dictated by the fear that the Qur'an might be forgotten through
the death of those who had memorised it. When 'Umar, may Allah be pleased
with him, saw many of the memorisers of the Qur'an fall in the Ridda War,
he feared that the Qur'an might be lost through their deaths and so he
suggested to Abu Bakr that it should be collected together into a book. The
Companions agreed to that and were pleased with it.
· The Companions of the Messenger agreed after his death that the hadd for
wine-drinking should be 80 lashes in view of the principle of masalih
mursala, since they observed that one of the consequences of intoxication
was the slander of chaste women.
· The Rightly-guided Khalifs agreed to make artisans responsible for any
goods of other people they were working on, even though the basic position
is that is the things in one's possession are a trust (under Islamic law trustees
are not responsible for unintentional damage to goods in their keeping). They
did so because it was found that if they were not made liable for them they

would make light of guarding other people's goods
1. The defection of various Arab tribes after the death of the Prophet, may Allah bless him
and grant him peace, brought about the Ridda War in which large numbers of Muslims were
slain.
and property. So in this case public interest demanded that artisans should be
made liable.
· 'Umar ibn al-Khattab, may Allah be pleased with him, used to confiscate
half of the wealth of governors who combined their personal wealth with
government assets and then used their position as governor to make a profit
on it. The benefit involved in that ruling was that he thought it that would
reform the governors and keep them from exploiting the office of
governorship for their own ends.
. It is also reported of 'Umar ibn al-Khattab that he poured away milk which
had been diluted with water, as a punishment for cheating. That was for the
general benefit in order that people might be protected from being cheated.
. It is also transmitted that 'Umar ibn al-Khattab had a group of people
executed for the murder of one person when they all participated in the
murder, because public interest demanded that even though no text existed to
support it. The benefit in this lies in the fact that it would otherwise become
possible to shed inviolable blood with impunity, resulting in a loophole in the
principle of retaliation. People would use assistance and partnership as a
means to commit murder since it would be known that no retaliation would
be demanded. If it is said that this is an innovative matter by which other
parties than the killer are executed even when they were not all actually
involved in the act of killing, the argument refuting this is that the killing
group is a collective and so collective execution is the same as executing an
individual, since killing is ascribed to the collective in the same way as it is
ascribed to an individual. Therefore, individuals who join together with the
aim of killing are considered as a single person. Public interest demands this
since it involves the prevention of bloodshed and the protection of society.
Malik found all these things and a great fund of other legal judgements which
had been left the f u q a h a ' of the Companions, may Allah be pleased with
them. Since he followed their methods and adhered to their path it was

impossible that he should stray from the aim and goal of the Lawgiver. His
fatwas were given with the object of ensuring benefit in all matters, both
public and private.
The Principle of adh-Dhara'i' (Means)
This is another of the principles on which Imam Malik often relied when
deriving judgements and in that respect Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal closely
resembled him. We will begin our discussion with the meaning and
categories of this term and then see how it becomes a legal principle which
can be used as evidence.
The meaning of dhari'a is "means". Sadd adh-dhara'i' (blocking the means)
implies preventing them, which entails making the means to what is
forbidden also forbidden; and fath adh-dhara'i' (facilitating the means)
entails making the means to what is obligatory also obligatory. Thus because
adultery is unlawful, looking at the private parts of a unrelated woman is also
unlawful because it is likely to lead to adultery. Because the J u m u ' a
prayer is an obligation, going to it is also an obligation, and leaving off
trading to go to it is also obligatory. Hajj is an obligation, and going to the
Sacred House and the other practices of Hajj are obligatory for its sake.
The principle of blocking or facilitating the means, according to al-Qarafi's
definition, is considered from the aspect of consolidation of the principle of
public interest which Malik adheres to. He considers general benefit to be the
outcome which the Lawgiver desires, esteems, calls for and encourages, and
so it is desirable to do anything that brings it about. Its opposite, which is
corruption, is forbidden. So all that is known to lead to benefit, definitely or
probably or mostly, even if it is not predominant, is desirable, and all that is
known to lead, whether certainly or only probably, to corruption must be
avoided.
The Principle of Common Usage (' A d a t) and Custom
('Urf)
Custom is a matter on which a community of people agree in the course of

their daily life, and common usage is an action which is repeatedly performed
by individuals and communities. When a community makes a habit of doing
something, it becomes its common usage. So the custom and common usage
of a community share the same underlying idea even if what is understood by
them differs slightly.
Maliki fiqh, like Hanafi fiqh, makes use of custom and considers it a legal
principle in respect of matters about which there is no definitive text. In fact
it has an even deeper respect for custom than the Hanafi school since, as we
have seen, public interest and general benefit are the foundation of Maliki
fiqh in coming to decisions and there is no doubt that respect for a custom
which contains no harm is one of the types of benefit. It is not valid for any
faqih to leave it: indeed, it is obligatory to adopt it. We find that the Malikis
abandon analogy when custom opposes it. Custom makes the general specific
and qualifies the unqualified, as far as the Malikis are concerned.
Making use of custom in this way is taken from an instance when the
Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said to the wife of Abu
Sufyan, "Take from the property of Abu Sufyan what is adequate for you and
your child in a normal manner." In this hadith custom is clearly made the
basis of a legal decision.
Many judgements are based on ' u r f because in many cases it coincides with
public interest and public interest is indisputably a fundamental principle in
Malik's school. Another reason is that custom necessarily entails people's
familiarity with a matter, and so any judgement based on it will receive
general acceptance whereas divergence from it will be liable to cause distress,
which is disliked in the judgement of Islam because Allah Almighty has not
imposed any hardship on people in His deen.
Allah Almighty prescribes what normal people deem proper and are
accustomed to, not what they dislike and hate. So when a custom is not a vice
and is respected by people, honouring it will strengthen the bond which
draws people together because it is connected to their traditions and social
transactions whereas opposition to it will destroy that cohesion and bring
about disunity.
This especially applies where patterns of speech are concerned, since natural

lucidity demands that expressions be understood in accordance with
customary usage. It is also desirable to apply custom where commercial
contracts are concerned as long as there is nothing unlawful in doing so. If
there is, however, it is of course obligatory to not adhere to custom.
Conclusion
These are the fundamental principles of Imam Malik, may Allah be pleased
with him, which the scholars of his school have derived from the corpus of
the secondary rulings transmitted from him. It is by means of them that his
rulings were derived and upon them that they are based.
The first thing to be noticed about these principles is their flexib i l i t y. He
did not make the unqualified text of the Book or the Sunna unequivocal. He
opened the door to making its general texts specific and to qualifying what is
unqualified. Just as he opened the door of specification, he showed there to
be flexibility in the texts which facilitated the means of deriving judgements
from them. A faqih should not be inflexible where the text is concerned, nor
should he be excessively flexible.
The principles are all interconnected, one amplifying another, and so any
unfamiliar meanings are winnowed out in favour of a meaning derived from
an immediate principle. From that there emerges a mature fiqh that is strong,
straightforward, familiar and known - one which people readily accept.
The second thing to be noticed after the flexibility of these principles is their
orientation towards achieving the greatest benefit in the most direct manner.
Analogy is made a way of achieving this. I s t i h s a n is employed to achieve
it by preferring a ruling derived by it if analogy is less apt to achieve the
desired benefit. Consideration of public interest is made into a principle in
order to achieve it by the easiest way. Malik also employed the method of
facilitating or blocking the means which is also considered to be one of the
fundamental principles used in deriving rulings. Then, finally, he considered
custom, which is another means of removing distress, averting hardship,
achieving benefit, and fulfilling people's needs.
Malik saw that the basic aim of the Divine Lawgiver in His Shari'a was to

realise the greatest benefit for the maximum number of people and so he
made all his fiqh which was not based on an unequivocal text centre on this
principle. He supports it by facilitating and blocking the means and other
ways which lead to it, in order to achieve it by the quickest and easiest
manner.
Thirdly, the principles which Malik used in deriving judgements are
interconnected with and complementary to one another. All are derived from
the same source and follow the same guidance: namely, the definitive text, its
spirit and meaning and the ways in which the Prophet and the Companions
applied it. Hence his fi q h is aimed at the same goal: the welfare of people in
this world and the Next and following path of the Prophet and Companions
without any innovation.
We find that Malik relies on the cases and f a t w a s of the Companions in
recognising the objective of the Shari'a and then recognises the judgements
of those of the following generation with deep knowledge of the texts and
goals of the Shari'a and of its immediate and long-term consequences. In so
doing, Malik opened the same methodology for his students who came after
him and their students. They understood fiqh as he did and followed his way.
So Maliki figh spread far and wide and as a result the Way followed by the
Prophet and his Companions in Madina has been preserved for all posterity.
Abu Hanifa
(d.150/767)
Preface
Praise belongs to Allah, the Lord of the Worlds, and peace and blessings be
upon our master Muhammad and his family and Companions.
This is a study of Imam Abu Hanifa - his life, opinions and fiqh. I first
address his life in order to understand his personality, psychology and
thought, so that I can offer the reader a true and sound picture in which the

special qualities and attributes of this Imam are revealed. Then I examine his
views on dogma, f a t w a s and analogy.
Deriving a true picture of Abu Hanifa from the books of history and
biographies is not easy since the adherents of his school have been excessive
in their praise, going beyond acceptable bounds, and his detractors have been
equally intemperate in their criticism. When faced with these two extremes,
the investigator who seeks only the truth may be confused and this
uncertainty can only be resolved with difficulty and great effort.
I think that I have managed to reveal a true picture of Imam Abu Hanifa, with
all its shadows and shafts of light, and in the process of discovering it I have
shed light on the time in which he lived and mentioned some details of the
most notable contemporary sects. It is certain that he used to argue and
debate with these sects and that their opinions and ideas were much discussed
at that time. Mentioning them will clarify the spirit of the age and the currents
of thought prevalent in it.
Then I examine his opinions on politics and dogma. This is necessary if we
want to study all the intellectual aspects of any t h i n k e r. His views on
politics had an effect on the course of his life. To ignore them would be to
ignore an important aspect of his personality, psychology, heart and
thought. His views on dogma were the clarification of all the ideas prevailing
in his age and the pure core of the opinions of those who were free of excess
and extravagance. They were a sound expression of the views of the Muslim
community. Indeed, they are the core of the deen and the spirit of certainty.
I then go on to look at his fiqh, which is the primary goal of this study. I
begin by elucidating the general principles which he used in his deduction
and which define its path and clarify his method in ijtihad. For this I rely on
what the early Hanafis wrote regarding the principles on which they
depended and the method employed by Abu Hanifa. Concerning that I chose
to be succinct rather than comprehensive, general rather than specific, and did
not go into all the principles mentioned by the Hanafis since many of them
cannot be ascribed to the Imam and his companions but come from a later
period.
Having identified the method of Abu Hanifa, I turn to the study of some of

the secondary areas of his views derived from a detailed examination of his
life, such as some of the areas of fiqh which are connected to human free will
in respect of property and some of the areas which are connected to trade and
merchants in a general fashion. Scholars also mention that Abu Hanifa was
the first to speak on legal stratagems and so it is essential to clarify that area
of his thought, distinguishing the reality of what he did, and balance between
what is actually transmitted from him and what is said about him.
In all the methods and branches mentioned, the Imam's thought will be
clarified by mentioning some of the disagreements between him and his
companions. Clarification of their differences will show their ideas and
orientations.
In order to reach a fruitful conclusion to this study, it was also necessary to
clarify the action of the later adherents of this school in respect of the
intellectual legacy left by the Imam and what subsequent generations did with
it when faced with disparate customs. It was also necessary to examine the
extent to which deduction played a part in the school and to look at the
flexibility of its general principles of extrapolation and the role it had in
preserving the path of Islam, and the Book and the Sunna and their guidance.
We must affirm that the need for the help of Allah Almighty in doing this is
immense. If it were not for His help, we should not reach any end or achieve
any goal. We beseech Him to help us and grant us success.
Muhammad Abu Zahra Dhu'l-Qa'da 1364
November 1945
Foreword
It says in al-Khayrat al-Hisan b y Ibn Hajar al-Haytami alMakki: "The
renown of a man in the past is indicated by the disagreement of people
regarding him. Do you not see that when 'Ali died, may Allah ennoble his
face, there were two parties: one of which intensely loved him and the other
of which intensely hated him?"
This test is true of many people and can also be applied to Abu Hanifa.
People were partisan about him to the extent that some people practically put

him in the ranks of the Prophets and claimed that the Torah gave the good
news of him and that Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace,
had mentioned him by name and stated that he was the Lamp of his
Community. They attributed to him endless virtues and qualities and exalted
him above his rank. On the other hand, some people were partisan against
him to a fanatical extent, accusing him of being a heretic and of leaving the
path, corrupting the deen and abandoning the Sunna. Indeed, they accused
him of contradicting it and giving fat was regarding the deen without
evidence or clear authority. Some of them went to excess in attacking him
and were not content with unfounded falsification, but were so intensely
hostile that they attacked his deen, personality and faith.
This happened even while Abu Hanifa was still alive and discussing with his
students the requirements of fatwas: what should be taken from h a d i t h,
what should be derived by analogy and rules, and how to conduct ijtihad in a
proper manner.
Why was there such disagreement about him? There are various reasons for it
which shall be examined in detail in the course of this study. But it is
appropriate to mention here one reason which may be the basis of the others.
Abu Hanifa had a forceful personality which caused his method in figh to
spread beyond his own circle and region to other regions of the Islamic
world. People discussed his views in most areas of the Islamic world, some
opposing them and some agreeing with them.
His views had opponents and supporters. Those who depended on texts alone
regarded them as an innovation in the deen a n d strongly objected to them.
Sometimes the point of objection was not even the opinion of Abu Hanifa,
who was a scrupulous and godfearing man, but was merely something
wrongly attributed to him. The opponent would speak of it because he saw it
as an innovation without knowing its basis or who had actually said it. The
sharpness of the criticism was sometimes blunted when the critic saw him or
learned the evidence on which the judgement was based. Sometimes the critic
would then respect the opinion and agree with him.
An illustration of such an instance is found in respect of alAwza'i, the fa q i
h of Syria, who was a contemporary of Abu Hanifa. He said to 'Abdullah ibn
al-Mubarak, "Who is this innovator who has emerged in Kufa called Abu

Hanifa?" Ibn al-Mubarak did not answer him, but began to mention some
difficult questions and how to understand them and give f a t w a regarding
them. He asked, "Who gave these fatwas?" He replied, "A shaykh I met in
Iraq." Al-Awza'i said, "This is a noble shaykh. Go and take a lot from him."
"It is Abu Hanifa," he stated. After that al-Awza'i and Abu Hanifa met in
Makka and discussed the questions which Ibn al-Mubarak had mentioned. He
investigated them. When they parted, al-Awza'i said to Ibn al-Mubarak, "I
envy the man his great knowledge and intelligence. I ask forgiveness of
Allah. I was in clear error. Devote yourself to the man. He is not as they say
about him." (al-Khayrat al-Hisan, p. 33)
The conflict between his supporters and opponents intensified in the fourth
century AH when m a d h h a b partisanship became prevalent and fiqh was
debated by partisans. There were debates in people's houses and in mosques
about these matters so that whole days were spent in debates and arguments
about m a d h h a b. Each was a supporter of his Imam and partisan on his
behalf. It is in this time that most of the biographies of the Imams were
written, usually with excessive praise of the particular Imam in question and
attacking the others. The conflict was extremely severe between the Hanafis
and the Shafi'is. That is why these two Imams became t a rgets for bitter
attacks, given the extreme partisanship of their supporters.
Abu Hanifa, of course, was a target because of the great number of fatwas he
gave based on opinion which led people to attack his knowledge of h a d i t h
s, his scrupulousness, the quality of his f a t w a s and other things which
were connected to his school regarding deduction and extrapolation. The
fanatics attacked him for all those things and some exceeded the bounds to
such an extent that some Shafi'is objected to it and saw such attacks as
tantamount to sin and improper conduct. Some of those people were fair
towards Abu Hanifa and recorded his virtues and refuted what the extreme
Shafi'is said. Thus we note that as-Suyuti, a Shafi'i, wrote a treatise on the
virtues of Imam Abu Hanifa. We further see that Ibn Hajar al-Haytami al-
Makki, also a Shafi'i, wrote a treatise entitled al-Khayrat al-Hisan on the
virtues of Imam Abu Hanifa. Ash-Sha'rani also mentions and defends Abu
Hanifa.
A researcher does not find it easy to deal with Abu Hanifa because of the
confusion of reports concerning him, which are like heaps in which jewels

are mixed with mud, so that it is difficult to sift through them and find the
true jewels in the midst of the muck. It requires a great deal of scrutiny and
sifting.
It is the same with his opinions, where we also find the path difficult to
follow because there is no book transmitted from Abu Hanifa in which he
recorded his opinions or his principles. We only find opinions transmitted
from him through his students, especially the books of Imam Abu Yusuf and
Imam Muhammad ash-Shaybani which transmitted his opinions with those of
his companions and those of some of the Iraqis contemporary with him, like
Ibn Shibrama, Ibn Abi Layla and 'Uthman al-Batti. But if we rely totally on
what his two main students said, we will still not have a complete picture.
There are many gaps which must be filled because their books certainly do
not report all of the views of Abu Hanifa and so we must examine other
sources as well. All of this requires precise investigation and research.
Another drawback is that the fundamental principles and methods of
deduction used by Abu Hanifa are not recorded either and we cannot know
them in detail from what is transmitted from him or from his students or other
people. Those principles which are recorded are deduced from the body of
the secondary judgements he made and how they are connected. There are
various sources which do this, among which are the treatise of Abu'l-Hasan
alKarkhi, the treatise of ad-Dabusi and the letter of al-Bazdawi. But the
methods recorded are not transmitted from the Imam or his companions: they
are only deduced from the Imams who formulated the Hanafi school. Thus it
is not easy to uncover the sources of the school.
Another deficiency encountered when studying Abu Hanifa is that we do not
find anything transmitted from him other than his legal opinions. As for his
views on dogma and on the imamate, we do not find anything about them in
the books of his companions. Some views on dogma are reported from him in
certain books ascribed to him, including the book entitled al-Fiqh al-Akbar, a
small treatise on which many commentaries have been written, and the
Treatise of the Scholar and Student. There is also his letter to 'Uthman al-
Batti.
But we do not, for instance, find any opinion about the imamate recorded by
his pen or by dictation or transmitted by any of his companions. His life and

the events and trials which occurred during it, however, do inform us about a
specific political position. His biography affirms his firm connection to Imam
Zayd ibn 'Ali, Zayn al-'Abidin, and other Shi'ite Imams, and the statements
of his companions indicate that his inclination, as was true of the Persians as
a whole, was with the descendants of 'Ali and that his trial occurred because
of this leaning. Nevertheless, there is no suggestion of this in any of the
books ascribed to him or in any of the reports transmitted from him. There is
no doubt that his opinion about the imamate was mentioned in his circle at
times and that he differed from the Abbasids.
But his companions, especially Abu Yusuf and Muhammad ash-Shaybani,
were firmly attached to the Abbasids and both acted as qadis for them. They
did not record the opinions of their shaykh regarding the Abbasid government
and diminishing its authority. That is the reason why many of his opinions
are lost in the past and can only be rediscovered with great difficulty.
These are gaps which the historian must strive to fill and they illustrate the
difficulty involved in studying him. Moreover, the school of Abu Hanifa is
found both in the East and the West and has been subject to the disparate
customs of different regions. It became the official school for a long time
under the Abbasids, and when the Ottomans took on the position of khalif
they also made it their official madhhab and so it became the madhhab of the
khalifate. It was the official school in Iraq, Egypt, Syria, and other places,
and its influence extended as far as India and it also became the school of the
Muslims in China. The scholars in all these different regions had their own
deductions and so there are many differing opinions on questions within the
Hanafi madhhab.
Chapter One The Life and Times of Abu Hanifa
His birth and lineage
According to most sources, Abu Hanifa was born in Kufa in 80 AH.
Although there is almost total agreement on this, there is one source which
posits 61AH, but this does not tally with the facts of his life since it is agreed
that he did not die until 150 AH. Most say that he died after al-Mansur
instituted the Inquisition. If he had been born in 61 AH, he would have been
90 at that time.

His father was Thabit ibn Zawti al-Farisi, a Persian. His grandfather was one
of the people of Kabil who was captured in the Arab conquest of the region.
He was enslaved to one of the Banu Taym and then freed. His wala' belonged
to this tribe and so he was a Taymi by clientage. This information was
transmitted by the grandson of Abu Hanifa, 'Umar ibn Hammad, but 'Umar's
brother Isma'il said that Abu Hanifa was an-Nu'man ibn Thabit ibn
anNu'man ibn al-Marzban. He said, "By Allah, we were never enslaved."
So his grandsons disagreed about his lineage. One said that his grandfather
was called Zawti and the other that his name was anNu'man. The first said
that he was captured and enslaved and the second completely denied it. The
author of al-Khayrat al-Hisan combined the two versions, maintaining that
the grandfather had two names, Zayti and an-Nu'man. He denied the
enslavement. This present work agrees with the names but not the fact of
enslavement, because the second version totally excludes it.
It seems probable that he was captured in the conquest, but that grace was
shown him, which was the custom of the Muslims towards some of the
important people of conquered lands, so as to uphold their position and
importance in Islam and to bring their hearts and those of their children close.
Reliable sources state that he was a Persian and not an Arab or a Babylonian.
Whether his grandfather was enslaved or not, he and his father were born free
men. In any case, the fact that he was a client in no way detracts from his
worth. The major exponents of fiqh in the time of the Tabi'un, whom Abu
Hanifa met and from whose fiqh he extrapolated, were clients of tribes rather
than pure Arabs. Most of the fuqaha' in the time of the Tabi'un and indeed
the following generation were clients.
In al-'Aqd al-Farid, Ibn 'Abdu Rabbih says:
Ibn Abi Layla said: 'Isa ibn Musa, a religious and very partisan man, asked
me, "Who is the faqih of Iraq?" I replied, "Al-Hasan ibn Abi'l-Hasan (al-
Basri)."
"Then who?"
I said, "Muhammad ibn Sirin."
"Who are those two?" he asked.
"Two clients," I replied.

"Who is the faqih of Makka?" he asked.
"""Ata ibn Abi Rabah, Mujahid, Sa'id ibn Jubayr or Salman ibn Yasar," I
replied.
"Who are they?"
"Clients."
"Who are the fuqaha' of Madina?"
"Zayd ibn Aslam, Muhammad ibn al-Munkadir, and Nujayh ibn Abi
Nujayh," I replied.
"And who are they?" he asked.
"Clients," I said.
His face changed colour. Then he asked, "Who knows the most fiqh of the
people of Quba'?"
"Rabi'a ar-Ra'y and Ibn Abi'z-Zinad," I responded.
"Who are they?"
"Clients."
He scowled and then asked, "Who is the fa q i h o f Yemen?"
"Tawus, his son, and Ibn Munabbah," I replied. "Who are they?" he asked.
"Also clients."
His veins bulged and he stood up. "And who is the faqih of Khorasan?"
"""Ata' ibn 'Abdullah al-Khurasani."
"Who is this 'Ata'?"
"A client," I said.
'His scowl deepened and he glared until I became quite afraid of him. Then
he said, "Who is the faqih of Syria?"
"Makhul," I replied.
"Who is this Makhul?"
"A client," I said.
He began breathing hard and then asked, "Who is the faqih of Kufa?"
By Allah, were it not for fear for him, I would have said, "Al-Hakim ibn
'Utba and Hammad ibn Abi Sulayman," but seeing his violent state I replied,
"Ibrahim an-Nakha'i and ash-Sha'bi."
"Who are they?" he asked.
"Two Arabs," I replied.
"Allah is greater!" he exclaimed and calmed down.
There are other transmissions to the same effect from other sources which
indicate that, during the time in which Abu Hanifa grew up, knowledge was
for the most part among the clients. Since they lacked the glory of lineage,

Allah gave them the glory of knowledge which is purer and more lasting.
This shows the truth of the prophecy of the Messenger of Allah, may Allah
bless him and grant him peace, that knowledge would be found among the
sons of Persia. We find the h a d i t h in al-Bukhari, Muslim, ashShirazi, and
at-Tabarani: "If knowledge were suspended in the Pleiades, some of the men
of Persia would still obtain it."
Before going into Abu Hanifa's lineage, we should perhaps first discuss the
reason why, in Umayyad times, knowledge was found mostly among the
clients. There were several reasons for this.
· In Umayyad times, the Arabs had authority and power and
they fought wars and went on expeditions. All of which distracted them from
study and learning. The clients, on the other hand, were free to study, analyse
and investigate. They realised that they lacked power and so they wanted to
obtain honour by a means which was within their grasp: knowledge. Social
deprivation can lead to excellence, high aspirations and splendid deeds, and
indeed it led those clients to master the intellectual life of Islam while the
Arabs were politically and economically dominant.
. The Companions spent a lot of time with the clients. keeping their company
morning and evening so the clients were able to take from the Companions
what they had learned from the Messenger of Allah. When the era of the
Companions ended, they became the bearers of knowledge after them and
thus it was that most of the great Tabi'un were clients.
· The clients came largely from ancient civilisations with developed cultures
and science. This had an effect on the formation of their ideas and the
direction of their pursuits, and indeed, at times, on their beliefs. Devotion to
knowledge was part of their nature.
. The Arabs were not people of crafts and learning; and when someone
devotes himself to knowledge, it becomes like a craft. A lengthy discussion
about this can be found in Ibn Khaldun.
His upbringing
Abu Hanifa grew up in Kufa and was educated there and lived most of his